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Recent public policy in the UK has been dominated by a discourse which asserts that public 
expenditure on universal health coverage and welfare is a burden on the productive 
economy and unaffordable in what has been deemed a time of austerity. There is a widely 
held assumption that universal welfare provision, as offered by most modern, welfare states 
is a luxury, only afforded since the World War 2 by wealthier economies. According to this 
view, if the productive efficiency of the economy falters, then this luxury should be trimmed 
back aggressively. Reduction in  universal welfare will relieve enterprise, capital, and so-
called hard-working families from the burdens of taxation required to fund these 
unproductive public services and (by implication) those unproductive families—the poor. 
We argue from history that there should be an end to setting the goal of economic growth 
against that of welfare provision. A healthy and prospering society needs both. We suggest 
that they feed each other. 
A long-term historical perspective shows how universal benefits funded by progressive 
taxation can both assure health and welfare and support social cohesion, with concomitant 
processes and behaviours likely to be important stimulants for a productive economy. 
Investing in universal health coverage and welfare makes for national prosperity every bit as 
much as the increasing wealth of an economy provides the funding for enhanced health and 
social security. 
We begin with England’s 200-year rise to global economic pre-eminence during the 
course of the 17th and 18th centuries. This was intimately associated with the innovation, 
under Elizabeth I’s rule, of the Poor Laws. Elizabeth acceded to the throne at a difficult time. 
The country was at war with France, and was near bankrupt, there were poor harvests, and 
the dissolution of the monasteries by her father, King Henry VIII, had removed the 
associated welfare system provided by the Catholic Church. The Elizabethan Poor Laws of 
1598 and 1601 were an extraordinary response; pragmatic in origin, but drawing 
nonetheless on principles of the common good. The laws were based on social relations 
and mutual rights and responsibilities of local communities caring for all kith and kin. They 
provided, for the first time, access to support in times of need for all people settled in the 
parish. They enshrined an absolute “right of relief” for every subject of the Crown. They 
created a nationwide system of social security through a progressive community tax to fund 
provision at local level. This was predicated on the assumption that poverty is an 
unavoidable and common risk, which can be shared and mitigated. 
Relief was provided by the Anglican parish (averaging 500 persons each in 1600) as the 
designated unit of Tudor local government. Each parish was mandated to establish a fund 
to offer a comprehensive safety net against destitution as required and throughout the year 
for vulnerable groups, including orphans, widows, older people, individuals with 
disabilities, the unemployed, and single mothers and their children. The system of 
progressive taxation that maintained the fund was levied on all occupiers of land in the 
parish, pro rata to the value of the land occupied. In principle, everyone contributed and 
everyone was entitled to benefit. In practice, the better-off paid most regularly but there 
were many who both paid in, and drew support from, the Poor Law at different stages of 
their lives. Since there was a statutory compulsion on the prosperous to take financial 
responsibility for their parish poor, the system also built in a motivation towards the 
philanthropic development of local schools, alms houses, and also hospitals. Such 
development was seen as reducing the burden of the poor on the parish funds and was 
facilitated by Elizabeth I’s Charitable Uses Act of 1601. Locally resident Justices of the 
Peace ensured the system’s financial probity and also—crucially—offered the poor 
accessible justice and a right of appeal. 
Poor Laws did exist in many cities in early modern Europe, but the English system was 
unique in its scale and geographical ubiquity, extending to every small rural parish. By the 
1800s, England’s Poor Law was transferring about 2% of gross national product in support 
to the nation’s poor in crisis years. Although modest by today’s standards, this was the most 
generous such system in the world at that time. 
Between 1600 and 1800, the English economy overtook the world leader in 1600, 
Holland, as the most urbanised society in the world. London became the world’s largest city 
and the population as a whole was fed by a sustained increase in agricultural productivity 
despite a shrinking proportion of the workforce on the land. This, in turn, released labour for 
the economy’s manufacturing and commercial trading activities. While her great imperial 
rival at this time France—lacking a universal poor law—saw social breakdown and 
revolution, England experienced a comparatively peaceful industrial transition, despite the 
stresses of economic transformation and rising population. During this time, England’s 
population doubled from about 4 million to over 8·5 million with average life expectancy 
improving slightly and without associated famine. Since the 1620s, there has been no 
significant famine in England. The English nation was the first in Europe to be free from this 
age-old, devastating insecurity, demonstrating the importance of effective social policy in 
achieving this fundamental freedom. 
Elizabeth I’s Poor Law released the populace from over-attachment to the family’s land 
patrimony as the only source of security, and offered a collective alternative support in old 
age, so older people were less reliant on children. Consequently, labour, the most crucial 
variable factor of production, was highly mobile with young adults regularly moving for work. 
England’s rate of provincial and metropolitan urban growth was exceptional. The Poor Law 
also underpinned a buoyant level of effective demand for consumption of basic goods, even 
in times of dearth, by maintaining the purchasing power of the poorer section of society 
when food prices rose. Overall, it facilitated the most sustained period of rising economic 
prosperity in the nation’s history. By the first half of the 19th century England had become 
the most dynamic economy in the world, underpinned by its social security system. 
This all seems to have been thoroughly forgotten. Modern welfare states since 1945 have 
been seen as something completely new. This amnesia is perhaps due to the radical 
reforms of the Poor Laws in 1834. These reforms dramatically altered their character from a 
universal system to one based on utilitarianism. The 1834 “New” Poor Laws were premised 
on ideas of individual self-interest, choice, and responsibility—ideas that had gained 
ground during the 18th century. They led away from an attitude of shared risk mitigated by 
contribution to a welfare safety net, to a harshly deterrent system, all but criminalising the 
poor, who were treated as work-shy moral delinquents. The corrosive social and moral 
consequences of the 1834 Poor Laws have been imprinted in the nation’s consciousness 
from Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist of 1838 to George Orwell’s The Road to Wigan Pier of 
1937. The Victorians’ new zero-sum belief system saw any penny given to the idle poor as a 
penny lost to the productive rich. However, there is no evidence that this changed approach 
improved the economy’s productivity. In fact, annual growth rates of Britain’s  gross 
domestic product (GDP) fell behind those of its main rivals during the decades after 1870. 
Not until after 1945 did the economy return to sustained high GDP growth rates during 
the following three decades. Universalist principles of progressively funded health and 
welfare provision were reinstated and became stimulants of a dynamic period of per 
capita economic growth, widely spread prosperity, and upward mobility in Britain. All, 
including the poorest, again enjoyed a measure of security and opportunity, and 
differences between the wealth of rich and poor reached an all-time low in the 1970s. 
The UK must now consider how best to govern itself outside the European Union. After 
more than three decades of lower economic growth rates and rising domestic inequality, 
the rhetoric is about the necessity of governing for the wellbeing of all, and confronting 
these inequalities. This will not be best realised by policy that depends on further reducing 
taxation and welfare at the cost of social cohesion. Through a historical lens we can see 
how universal public services are not dependent on achievement of economic growth alone, 
but rather have themselves provided a crucial institutional context facilitating growth and 
sustained prosperity. In current attempts to reintegrate health and welfare provision for the 
common good, we would do well to reflect on the positive lessons of the long-enduring 
universalist Elizabethan Poor Laws. In his closing speech to the Conservative Party 
conference in 2014, the then Prime Minister David Cameron said that “you can only have a 
strong NHS if you have a strong economy”. The narrow view that spending on the National 
Health Service and social care is largely a burden on the economy is blind to the large 
national return to prosperity that comes from all citizens benefiting from a true sense of 
social security. There are signs that Theresa May subscribes to the same historically 
obsolete view. Despite her inaugural statement as Prime Minister on the steps of Downing 
Street, her Chancellor’s autumn statement signals continuing austerity with further cuts 
inflicted on the poor and their children, the vulnerable, and infirm older people. This 
country’s history shows that long-term prosperity has been served best when the interests of 
the poor and the wealthy are not mutually opposed in a zero sum game. Investment in 
policies that develop human and social capital will underpin economic opportunities and 
security for the whole population. 
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